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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In two recent cases, the United States Supreme Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) were asked to determine whether religious 
symbols (specifically crosses and crucifixes) could be placed on public 
property.1  This was not a simple task however, as the crosses at issue in the 
case served both religious and secular purposes.  In addition to being crosses, 
they were also war memorials and symbols of a nation’s heritage.2  
Therefore, the courts were forced to address a question of which 
interpretation of the symbols to use, the secular one or the religious one.  
Supporters of the symbols argued that they were memorials erected in 
memory of fallen soldiers and national symbols.3  Opponents contended that 
the crosses were religious symbols and, as such, did not have a place in a 
secular world.   
Both cases involved crosses placed in highly visible locations and both 
courts rendered controversial decisions that elicited strong responses from 
each side.4  In the European case, Lautsi v. Italy, religious supporters in Italy, 
the Catholic Church, a number of other institutions from around the world, 
and some secular supporters spoke vehemently in favor of the cross.5  An 
equally large number of groups, from as many varied locations, opposed it.6  
In the United States case, Salazar v. Buono, the cross at issue caused such 
controversy that it was stolen after the Supreme Court issued its decision.7  
Because of these strong emotions, both courts had to decide between two 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 (2011) [hereinafter Lautsi II]; Salazar v. Buono, 130 
S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (U.S. 2010). 
 2 See Peter Petkoff, Religious Symbols Between Forum Internum and Forum Externum, in 
LAW AND RELIGION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 297 (Silvio Ferrari & Rinaldo Cristofori eds., 2010) 
for further discussion on symbols. 
 3 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 15. 
 4 Lautsi v Italy – A Lost Opportunity, EUR. HUMANIST FED’N (July 1, 2010), http://humanistf 
ederation.eu/lautsi-v-italy-a-lost-opportunity/ [hereinafter A Lost Opportunity]; Stijn Smet, 
Lautsi v. Italy: The Argument from Neutrality, STRASBOURG OBSERVER (Mar. 22, 2011), http://st 
rasbourgobservers.com/2011/03/22/lautsi-v-italy-the-argument-from-neutrality/.  The Pope also 
issued a formal condemnation of the initial Lautsi decision. Anna Arco & Cindy Wooden, 
Vatican Hails Ruling on Crucifixes: European Court of Human Rights Issues ‘Landmark’ 
Decision in Defence of Religious Freedom, CATH. HERALD (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.exacted 
itions.com/exact/browse/397/440/8537/3/1. 
 5 According to the CIA World Factbook, Italy is almost 90% Roman Catholic with small 
communities of Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim faiths.  Italy, C.I.A. WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html (last updated Oct. 4, 
2012) [hereinafter Italy – Factbook].  For a further discussion on those who supported Italy’s 
position please see infra Part II.A, discussing the response to the European Court of Human 
Rights’ first Lautsi decision.  
 6 See A Lost Opportunity, supra note 4 for an example of this reaction. 
 7 Lauri Lebo, Mojave Desert Cross is Stolen, RELIGION DISPATCHES (May 11, 2010), http:// 
www.religiondispatches.org/dispatches/laurilebo/2562/mojave_desert_cross_is_stolen.  
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unpleasant options.  If the court required that the symbols be removed it 
would displease those who advocated for religious symbols in the public 
square.  However, allowing the symbols to stay would displease those who 
advocated strict separation of church and state.  The courts could have 
determined that the crosses should be removed from public property because 
of their relatively undisputed religious connotation as a well-recognized 
symbol of the Christian faith.8  However, if the U.S. Supreme Court had 
made this decision, a war memorial would have to be torn down.9  In the 
European Union, a similar decision would have meant requiring a 
predominantly Catholic nation to take down crucifixes in a number of 
institutions.10  Furthermore, the success of a decision requiring removal of 
crosses in the European Union was uncertain because the ECtHR has a 
relatively small amount of influence over the states of the European Union.11 
Alternatively, the courts could have allowed the crosses to remain where 
they were.  However, this would implicitly recognize as acceptable religious 
symbols erected on public property.  This outcome was unlikely in the 
United States because of strong notions of strict separation of church and 
state, and it would be unusual for the ECtHR given its past case history 
prohibiting religious symbols on public property.12  
The ECtHR in Lautsi, eventually chose to allow crucifixes to remain 
displayed in public schoolrooms by accepting the secular purpose: a symbol 
of national heritage.13  The issue in the United States in Salazar was more 
procedurally complicated than the direct constitutionality of crosses.  The 
actual issue in the case was whether a land transfer act Congress used to cure 
an Establishment Clause violation was constitutional.14 Congress attempted 
to remedy the constitutional violations connected with a cross placed on 
public property by transferring the land from public to private property.  
While the Supreme Court did not rule explicitly on the constitutionality of 
the cross, its decision did lay out theories of interpretation for religious 
symbols with secular meanings, including addressing the constitutionality of 
                                                                                                                   
 8 See RENÉ GUÉNON, THE SYMBOLISM OF THE CROSS (James R. Wetmore ed. Angus 
Macnab trans. 2004) (discussing the symbolism of the cross).  
 9 Will Rosenzweig & Daniel Shatz, Salazar v. Buono, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law. 
cornell.edu/supct/cert/08-472 (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).  
 10 See Italy – Factbook, supra note 5 (describing religious demographics of Italy). 
 11 As will be discussed later, the ECtHR has no formal ability to enforce its actions in EU 
states and instead depends on the good will of the nations for implementation.  Some states, 
like England, have provisions that explicitly enforce the decisions of the court.  John Hedigan, 
The European Court of Human Rights: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 12 GERMAN L.J. 
1716, 1729 (2011). 
 12 See infra Part II. 
 13 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 80. 
 14 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (U.S. 2010). 
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the cross itself.15  The language in the Court’s decision may point to a more 
accommodating test for religious symbols.16 
Both of the decisions, the ECHR’s explicit acceptance of a crucifix in a 
public school and the Supreme Court’s possible acceptance of a more 
accommodating test, suggest that both courts are moving in similar 
directions.  Furthermore, the direction they choose will have substantial 
consequences for future decisions.  While the beliefs of those who supported 
the cross and crucifix, including fears that courts would mandate the removal 
of all religious symbols from the public sphere, have been assuaged for the 
moment, many remain concerned for the future of religious symbols.17  
Equally vehement are those who argue that the current position of the 
ECtHR (and perhaps that of the Supreme Court) infringes on individuals who 
believe that the presence of the crosses violates their right to live a life free 
from religious influence.18  Thus, it appears likely that litigation on this issue 
will continue.19  For now, incorporating a principle of accommodation may 
be the clearest and best option for future cases.  It would afford protection for 
religious symbols while leaving open the possibility of rigorous review when 
indoctrination or oppression is a concern.  
It is not the purpose of this Note to offer a normative opinion on either of 
the decisions.  Rather, this Note seeks to perform an analysis of the two cases 
and explain some striking similarities in the positions taken by the two 
courts.  Two courts, with different cases and with different historical 
backgrounds and nationalities, appear ready to use or encourage tests that 
would allow greater presence of religious symbols in the public square so 
long as they do not invoke oppression or indoctrination.  In this manner, both 
of the court decisions indicate judicial openness to a principle of 
accommodation.  It is this, the parallel movement of the two courts reflecting 
a more nuanced perspective of the place of these symbols in the public 
sphere, that is the subject of this Note. 
                                                                                                                   
 15 Id. at 1835–36. 
 16 See infra Part II.B (discussing Salazar v. Buono). 
 17 For example, in response to the lower European Court of Human Rights decision, Joseph 
Weiler, in Crucifix in the Classroom Redux, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2010), articulated the 
issue by saying that: “Is one to revoke from the public space one’s symbols as if 
‘contaminated’ by their religious content? Change the British National Anthem? Amend the 
first phrase of the German Constitution?”   
 18 Gabriel Andreescu & Liviu Andreescu, The European Court of Human Rights’ Lautsi 
Decision: Context, Contents, Consequences, 9 J. STUDY RELIGIONS & IDEOLOGIES 47, 67 
(2010).  “A lay public sphere is the only solution to ensuring genuine equality between 
members of majority and minority churches, agnostics, atheists, or non-theists.  In the long 
term, this is the only way to eliminate religious (and anti-religious) tensions.”  Id. 
 19 See, e.g., Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (U.S. 2011) 
(exemplifying a more recent case dealing with a cross placed near a public highway.  
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To make this assertion first requires acknowledgment of the differences 
between the ECtHR and the U.S. Supreme Court.  The ECtHR does not 
operate under a charter that specifically restricts the interaction between 
church and state.20  The U.S. Constitution, on the contrary, does include 
restrictions on the government’s involvement with religion.21  The different 
national structures that formed the respective courts are also important 
because they effectuated significant differences between the functions of the 
courts.  For example, the European Union is more loosely unified than the 
United States and is an organization of states with unique histories, diverse 
citizenship and legal requirements, as well as different forms of 
government.22  Thus, a complete comparison would be inappropriate.  Yet, 
even with these differences, these two courts have indicated preferences for 
remarkably similar decisions.    Finally, note that the cases presented are not 
identical.  Lautsi addressed crucifixes placed in public schoolrooms.23  
Therefore, concerns with indoctrination were far more prevalent than in 
Salazar, where the cross at issue was a memorial placed in a public park.24  
Each of these will be extensively discussed in the next section.   
It is clear that singular single, concise answer to the questions before 
these courts may not be forthcoming.25  Concepts of religious liberty, 
particularly the symbols that proponents of each side believe they have the 
right to display or avoid, are by their nature divisive.26  However, a proper 
consideration of the decisions rendered is necessary before either side may 
press their case.   
Part II will give an outline of both Lautsi v. Italy and Salazar v. Buono 
and will explain some of the relevant case law and tests used to reach each of 
these decisions.  Part III will discuss the similarities between the tests used 
by the U.S. Supreme Court and by the ECtHR.  Part IV will provide a 
conclusion and briefly discuss the future of these tests.  
                                                                                                                   
 20 John Witte, Jr. & Nina-Louisa Arold, Lift High the Cross?: Contrasting the New 
European and American Cases on Religious Symbols on Government Property, 25 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 5, 8 (2011); U.S. CONST. amend. I (laying out the Establishment Clause, which 
specifically prohibits the government from making a “law respecting an establishment of 
religion”). 
 21 U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 22 Christopher J. Borgen, Whose Public, Whose Order? Imperium, Region, and Normative 
Friction, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 343 (2007); Andrew Ashworth, Self-Incrimination in 
European Human Rights Law — A Pregnant Pragmatism?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 751 (2008). 
 23 Lautsi II, supra note 1.  
 24 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (U.S. 2010). 
 25 Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 
1707 (2006).  
 26 See sources cited supra notes 4, 6.  
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II.  THE PATH OF THE CROSSES 
By the time Lautsi v. Italy and Salazar v. Buono reached the ECtHR and 
the Supreme Court respectively, they had developed complicated factual 
backgrounds and extensive lower court decisions.  The decisions of the lower 
courts are available in the records of those courts.  Therefore this Note will 
spend a substantial amount of time discussing the final decision in Lautsi and 
focus less on the early case law.27  
Salazar v. Buono will not be discussed as extensively, though this Note 
will give a brief background and history of the case.  The decision is slightly 
older than Lautsi and has been well covered in numerous articles that more 
completely and clearly elucidate that case and its background.28    
A. Lautsi v. Italy 
The controversy that initiated the Lautsi case was a parental disagreement 
with the state-mandated display of crucifixes in Italian public schools.  In 
Italy, a country with a long history and relationship with the Catholic 
Church, crucifixes had been a part of schools for decades.  Indeed, crosses 
have been displayed in Italian schoolrooms by governmental fiat for over a 
hundred years.29  During that time, governing bodies in Italy, including those 
prior to Italy’s unification and the Italian state itself, issued a number of 
administrative decrees, regulations, and treaties either requiring or 
encouraging crucifix displays.  One of the earliest was a royal decree by the 
Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia in 1860.30  This decree required that “each 
school must without fail be equipped . . . with a crucifix.”31  This regulation 
was also incorporated into the Constitution of Italy in 1861.32  In November 
of 1922, a Ministry of Education circular, Circular no. 68, “order[ed] all 
                                                                                                                   
 27 See Malcolm D. Evans, From Cartoons to Crucifixes: Current Controversies Concerning 
the Freedom of Religion and the Freedom of Expression Before the European Court of 
Human Rights, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 345 (2010–2011) for a full discussion on early case law 
regarding religious symbols in public places. 
 28 See, e.g., Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The Cross Between Endorsement and 
History, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42, 43 (2010); Angela C. Carmella, Symbolic 
Religious Expression on Public Property: Implications for the Integrity of Religious 
Associations, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 481 (2011); Marci A. Hamilton, The Endorsement 
Factor, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 349 (2011).  
 29 R.D. n. 4336/1860 (It.), art. 140 (Royal Decree of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia) 
[hereinafter Royal Decree]. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 17 (quoting Regio Decreto, supra note 29).  
 32 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.).  
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municipal administrative authorities in the Kingdom to restore to those 
schools which lack them, the . . . sacred symbol[ ] of faith.”33   
The country’s close ties to the Vatican further influenced the decision to 
place crucifixes in schools.34  In 1929, Italy and the Vatican signed the 
Lateran Pacts which, among other treaty provisions, confirmed Catholicism 
as Italy’s official religion.35  In 1984 the pacts were amended,36 formally 
revoking Catholicism as Italy’s religion in favor of a secular Italian state.37  
Regardless of these developments however, many schools in Italy continued 
displaying the crucifixes.38   
These laws and ordinances, requiring crucifixes in classrooms, remained 
relatively undisturbed until 2002 (although they were not always enforced).  
In that year, Ms. Lautsi, a woman who wanted her sons to have a secular 
education, initiated a case bringing her concerns about the display of the 
crucifixes to her local school board.39  Her sons had attended the Istituto 
comprensivo statale Vittorino da Feltre, a state run school in which a cross 
was displayed.40  At a meeting of the school’s governors, Ms. Lautsi and her 
husband requested that the governors consider removing the cross from the 
wall so that it did not affect her sons’ education.41  The governors refused 
Ms. Lautsi’s request.42  
A month later, in July of 2002, Ms. Lautsi filed suit in the Veneto 
Administrative Court alleging the crucifixes violated Articles 3 and 19 of the 
Italian Constitution.43  While the Lautsi trial was ongoing, the Minister of 
                                                                                                                   
 33 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 19.  
 34 Id. ¶ 20. 
 35 Id.  Article 1 of the Concilliation Treaty states: “Italy recognizes and reaffirms the 
principle established in the First Article of the Italian Constitution dated March 4 1848, 
according to which the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion is the only State religion.”  Id. 
 36 Id. ¶ 21. 
 37 Id. ¶¶ 21–22. Italy adopted its republican constitution in 1948, Article 7 of which 
explicitly acknowledges “the State and the Catholic Church are independent and sovereign, 
each in its own sphere.”  Art. 7 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).  
 38 Id. Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶¶ 21–24 (providing examples of cases in which schools 
continued to display crucifixes). 
 39 Id. ¶ 11. 
 40 Id. ¶ 10. 
 41 Id. ¶ 11. 
 42 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, ¶ 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) [hereinafter Lautsi I] (“On 
27 May 2002 the school’s governors decided to leave the crucifixes in its classrooms.”). 
 43 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 8; see also Constituzione [Const.] (It.): 
All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without 
distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and 
social conditions.  It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of 
an economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of 
citizens, thereby impeding the full development of the human person and the 
effective participation of all workers in the political, economic and social 
organisation of the country. 
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Education, Universities, and Research published Directive no. 2666 requiring 
all Italian public schools have crucifixes displayed in their classrooms.44  
Before coming to a decision, the Administrative Court, which had 
initially been granted jurisdiction, determined that the case was better suited 
for the Constitutional Court of Italy and chose not to rule on the merits of the 
case.45  The Constitutional Court, however, also determined that it would be 
inappropriate for it to issue a ruling because the laws governing the display 
of the crucifixes were statutory and therefore the case did not pose a 
constitutional question.46  In 2004, the Constitutional Court referred the case 
back to the Administrative Court.47  
Finally, in March 2005, the Administrative Court issued a ruling on the 
merits of Ms. Lautsi’s case.48  The court determined that the crucifixes did 
not violate any of Ms. Lautsi’s rights, or the rights of her children, under the 
laws of Italy.49  In explanation of its decision, the court stated that while 
the principle of the secular nature of the State [was] now part 
of the legal heritage of Europe and the western 
democracies . . . the presence of crucifixes in State-school 
classrooms, regard being had to the meaning it should be 
understood to convey, did not offend against that principle.50 
Ms. Lautsi then brought her case to the ECtHR according to the 
procedure set forth in Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.51  The case was given to one 
                                                                                                                   
This was characterized by the ECtHR as the “principle of equality.”  Lautsi II, supra note 1, 
¶ 12.  Article 19 of the Italian Constitution reads: “Anyone is entitled to freely profess their 
religious belief in any form, individually, or with others, and to promote them and celebrate 
rites in public or in private, provided they are not offensive to public morality.”  Art. 19 
Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).  This was referred to by the court as “religious freedom.”  Lautsi II, 
supra note 1, ¶ 12.  
 44 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 24 (indicating a general acceptance by the Italian political 
system of the crucifixes).  
 45 The justice system in Italy divides its cases into administrative, ordinary, and 
constitutional courts.  For a full explanation of the system, see The Italian Judicial System, 
http://ulr.unidroit.org/mm/TheItalianJudicialSystem.pdf (last viewed Sept. 22, 2011).  
 46 Lautsi I, supra note 42, ¶ 12 (“In decision no. 389 of 15 December 2004 the 
Constitutional Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction, seeing that the provisions 
complained of were not provisions of statute law but were contained in regulations, which did 
not have legal force.”).  
 47 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 14.  
 48 Id. ¶ 15. 
 49 Lautsi I, supra note 42, ¶ 13 (holding that the crucifix “was both the symbol of Italian 
history and culture . . . and the symbol of the principles of equality, freedom and tolerance of 
the state’s secular basis”).  
 50 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 14 (2011) (internal citations omitted).  
 51 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 34, 
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section of the court for initial determination.  There, Lautsi alleged that the 
crucifixes violated Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights.52  She asserted that displaying the sign of the 
cross in the state-school attended by her sons constituted interference 
incompatible with her (Ms. Lautsi’s) right to ensure that they receive 
education and teaching in conformity with her religious and philosophical 
convictions.  Furthermore, Ms. Lautsi asserted that displaying the sign of the 
cross also infringed on her freedom of belief and religion.53    
Ms. Lautsi’s argument was, essentially, that Italy was interfering with her 
ability to raise her children with a secular ideology. 
Furthermore, Ms. Lautsi claimed that,  
the provisions concerned were the legacy of a religious 
conception of the State which in present-day Italy was now in 
conflict with the State’s duty of secularism, and infringed the 
rights protected by the Convention.  There was a ‘religious 
question’ in Italy, since by requiring the crucifix to be 
displayed in classrooms the State was granting the Catholic 
Church a privileged position which amounted to State 
interference with the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion of the applicant and her children and the 
applicant’s right to bring up her children in conformity with her 
                                                                                                                   
Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter HR Convention] (regulating individual 
applications to the ECtHR).  Because the ECtHR’s jurisdiction is limited to hearing cases only 
when the remedies and procedures in the home state [Italy], have been exhausted, Ms. Lautsi 
had been previously unable to present her case to the Court.  European Court of Human 
Rights: The ECHR in 50 Questions, PUBLIC RELATIONS UNIT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 7, http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/5C53ADA4-80F8-42CB-B8BD-CB 
BB781F42C8/0/FAQ_ENG_A4.pdf (last visited July 2, 2013). 
 52 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 27; HR Convention, supra note 51.   Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 
provides “no person shall be denied the right to education.  In the exercise of any functions 
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of 
parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and 
philosophical convictions.” Id. art. 2.  
  Article 9 reads  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom 
to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Id. art. 9.  
 53 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 41.  
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moral and religious convictions, and a form of discrimination 
against non-Catholics.54 
It was the Lautsis’ assertion that the crucifix’s religious connotation was 
so dominant that a student could only understand its presence to be a state 
endorsement of religion.55  If this were true, this would be in conflict with 
Italy’s secular constitution and its obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.56  Finally, Ms. Lautsi also argued that Italy 
was favoring one religion (Catholicism or Christianity) over others.57  She 
asserted that Italy was indicating an adherence to a “particular religious 
belief,” rather than treating each religion equally.58  Ms. Lautsi claimed that, 
“[t]he concept of secularism required the State to be neutral and keep an 
equal distance from all religions, as it should not be perceived as being closer 
to some citizens than to others.”59   
The Italian government, however, argued that the crucifixes’ connotation 
was not limited solely to its religious meaning,60 but included an “ethical 
meaning which could be understood and appreciated regardless of one’s 
adhesion to the religious or historical tradition, as it evoked principles that 
could be shared outside Christian faith.”61  Concerned that this argument 
would be unacceptable to the Court, the Italian government argued in the 
alternative that the cross has no religious meaning at all.62  Instead Italy 
asserted that “the message of the cross . . . could be read independently of its 
religious dimension and was composed of a set of principles and values 
forming the foundations of [Italy’s democracy].”63 
The lower section of the ECtHR ruled in favor of the Lautsis.64  In its 
decision, the Chamber highlighted several issues.  First, the Chamber was 
concerned that the display of the crucifixes could be misinterpreted by 
students indicating a state  associated with a particular religion.  The 
Chamber saw this as problematic because “[w]hat may be encouraging for 
some religious pupils may be emotionally disturbing for pupils of other 
religions or those who profess no religion.”65  Second, the Chamber noted 
                                                                                                                   
 54 Lautsi I, supra note 42, ¶ 30. 
 55 Id.  
 56 Id.  
 57 Id.  
 58 Id.  
 59 Id. ¶ 32. 
 60 Id. ¶¶ 34–36. 
 61 Id. ¶ 35. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id.  
 65 Id. ¶ 55. 
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that Ms. Lautsi’s ability to raise her children was hindered when the state 
engaged in behavior that favored one religion over others.66  The Chamber 
explained that this hindrance occurred when few other religious symbols 
were displayed in schools .67  Under this theory, children could not 
reasonably expect to feel that all religions were equal.  The Chamber also 
required that Italy make restitution to the Lautsis as required under the 
Human Rights Convention for hindering their rights.68  
This decision led to an outcry in Italy and Europe.69  A number of 
prominent Italian legislators stated that they would not change Italian laws 
placing crucifixes in schoolrooms.70  However, it also led to great praise 
from those who wished for a more secular Europe.71  Unsurprisingly, given 
the tremendous outcry, the Grand Chamber swiftly granted Italy’s appeal of 
the Lautsi case.72  
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, the final decision making body of the 
Court, decided the case on March 18, 2011.73  The arguments presented to 
the Court at oral argument and in brief remained fairly similar to those in the 
earlier Lautsi case.  However, this time, numerous governments and 
organizations were given leave to intervene and express an opinion.  The 
governments of Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Russian Federation, Greece, 
Lithuania, Malta, and the Republic of San Marino, as well as a number of 
legislators from the European Council and several independent 
organizations, intervened on behalf of both Ms. Lautsi and Italy.74  The case 
and its final outcome were closely watched.   
After deliberation, the Court ruled in Italy’s favor.75  The Court based its 
decision on the concept of the margin of appreciation.76  This doctrine holds 
                                                                                                                   
 66 Id. ¶ 47(b) (stating: “It is on to the fundamental right to education that is grafted the right 
of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions, and the first sentence 
does not distinguish, any more than the second, between State and private teaching.”).  
 67 Id. ¶ 43. 
 68 Id. ¶¶ 67–70. 
 69 Lautsi v Italy: Crucifixes in the Classroom and ‘Dialogue’ with Strasbourg (Italian 
style), EDU. L. BLOG (Mar. 29, 2011, 4:18 PM), http://www.education11kbw.com/?p=263.  
 70 Andreescu & Andreescu, supra note 18. 
 71 Grégor Puppinck, Lautsi v. Italy: The Leading Case on Majority Religions in European 
Secular States, PRESENTATION PREPARED FOR THE 2010 ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
RELIGION SYMPOSIUM 1 (2010).  
 72 Lautsi II, supra note 1.  
 73 Id.  
 74 Id. ¶ 8 (intervening groups include the Greek Helsinki Monitor, Associazione nazionale 
del libero pensiero, European Centre for Law and Justice, Eurojuris, International 
Commission of Jurists, Interights and Human Rights Watch, Zentralkomitee der deutschen 
katholiken, Semaines sociales de France, Associazioni cristiane lavoratori italiani, and thirty-
three members of the European Parliament).  
 75 Id. ¶ 66 (stating there was no evidence that “the display of a religious symbol on 
classroom walls may have an influence on pupils and so it cannot reasonably be asserted that 
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that “the Contracting States [of the European Convention on Human Rights] 
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to 
ensure compliance with the Convention with due regard to the needs and 
resources of the community and of individuals.”77  The doctrine grants to the 
courts and to the contracting states of the European Union a great deal of 
flexibility in determining their states’ laws in relation to the various 
conventions.78  While the doctrine does not allow for a direct violation of the 
Convention, it does allow states to incorporate their national heritages and 
norms in conforming with the Conventions.79  
In reaching their decision, the Grand Chamber understood that the states 
of the European Union have an obligation to protect the rights of parents and 
students in public schooling.80  The Court noted that:  
the decision whether crucifixes should be present in State-
school classrooms forms part of the functions assumed by the 
respondent State in relation to education and teaching and, 
accordingly, falls within the scope of the second sentence of 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.  That makes it an area in which the 
State’s obligation to respect the right of parents to ensure the 
education and teaching of their children in conformity with 
their own religious and philosophical convictions comes into 
play.81   
However, the Court also determined that none of these rights held by the 
Lautsis had been violated by Italy’s policy supporting crucifixes.82  Instead, 
the Court decided that because the crucifixes were not used for educational 
purposes or even discussed, Ms. Lautsi’s rights were not infringed; meaning 
that the mere display of the crucifixes did not in fact keep her from raising 
her children in a secular manner.83  The Grand Chamber also determined that 
the policy Italy had pursued did not indicate a particular preference for any 
one religion, as no child was prohibited from expressing a different religious 
                                                                                                                   
it does or does not have an effect on young persons whose convictions are still in the process 
of being formed”). 
 76 Id. ¶ 68. 
 77 Id. ¶ 61. 
 78 See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International 
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 908 (2005) (asserting that the margin of appreciation doctrine 
has been classified as “non-intrusive”).  
 79 Id. 
 80 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 14.  
 81 Id. ¶ 65.  
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. ¶ 66.  
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preference.84  Therefore, because Italy did not prohibit any other religious 
faiths from being freely practiced in their schools, no person could 
reasonably decide that Italy had indoctrinated its students or chosen one 
religion over another.85   
Forming the boundary of the Grand Chamber’s decision were a number 
of other decisions addressing the ability of a member state, like Italy, to 
regulate religion and religious expression within its borders.  Some cases 
dealt with questions of religious garb or education in schools, while others 
dealt with the use of religion in holding public office.86  Other cases went so 
far as to address religion in television.87  Many of these decisions appear 
contradictory, but were relevant to the ECtHR’s decision in Lautsi.    
One case that became relevant to the Lautsi issue was Sahin v. Turkey.88  
This case, decided in 2004, dealt with a prohibition of Islamic headscarves in 
Turkey.89  A medical student studying at a university was denied admission 
to classes because she wore a headscarf in violation of Turkey’s secular 
regulations banning the wearing of religious regalia.90  Turkey had not 
required the universities to enforce a preexisting headscarf restriction in 
classes, and Sahin had worn the headscarf to class in the past.91  Turkey, 
however, changed its policy and, after advertising the change to students, 
formally banned all religious garb, turning away any who came to class 
                                                                                                                   
 84 Id. ¶ 74.  The Court noted that  
according to the indications provided by the Government, Italy opens up the 
school environment in parallel to other religions.  The government indicated 
in this connection that it was not forbidden for pupils to wear Islamic 
headscarves or other symbols or apparel having a religious connotation; 
alternative arrangements were possible to help schooling fit in with non-
majority religious practices; the beginning and end of Ramadan were ‘often 
celebrated’ in schools; and optional religious education could be organized in 
schools for ‘all recognized religious creeds’ . . . Moreover, there was nothing 
to suggest that the authorities were intolerant of pupils who believed in other 
religions, were non-believers or who held non-religious philosophical 
convictions.  
 Id. 
 85 Id. ¶ 66 (noting that because Islamic students were able to wear their headscarves and 
pray, and because Jewish students were able to observe Hanukkah, the crucifixes were not 
enough to violate the European Convention).  This distinction became key to the decision and 
is a distinguishing factor between Lautsi and many of the cases discussed in this Note. 
 86 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); Grzelak v. Poland, App. No. 
7710/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Folgreo and Others v. Norway, App. No. 1572/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2007).  
 87 Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), App. No. 13470/87 (1994). 
 88 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005). 
 89 Id. ¶ 3. 
 90 Id. ¶ 16. 
 91 Id. ¶ 17. 
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dressed in the banned attire.92  When Sahin tried to enter her classroom, she 
was refused admittance.93  Sahin claimed that this refusal violated her rights 
under the Human Rights Convention and, after a thorough review in Turkey, 
appealed the law to the ECtHR.94  
The ECtHR determined that Turkey’s law did not violate the 
Convention’s requirements.95  The court explained that while “having regard 
to the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation in this [religious regulation] 
sphere, the court finds that the interference in issue was justified in principle 
and proportionate to the aim pursued.”96   
Another relevant case was Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria, in which 
the ECtHR allowed Austria to regulate and ban a movie that depicted the 
Holy Family in an inappropriate manner.97  In another case, Kokkinakis v. 
Greece, the ECtHR concluded that a Greek law outlawing proselytism was 
legal under Article 9 of the Convention.98  Furthermore, in Grzelak v. Poland 
and Folgero v. Norway (both cases mentioned by the ECtHR in the Lautsi 
decision), the court dealt with various regulations requiring students to 
receive religious education while they were in schools.99  During these cases 
“the court dealt with forms of religious instruction in public schools that 
were challenged by professed atheists and agnostics . . . . It found that the 
state had not tailored its new law carefully enough to deal with students with 
different religious and non-religious sensibilities.”100  Therefore, in reaching 
each decision the Court was aware of and considered the different facts and 
contexts of each case, as well as the various nations and nationalities 
involved.   
1. Using the Margin of Appreciation 
The margin of appreciation was crucial to the Grand Chamber’s decision 
in Lautsi.  Without its use, it is unlikely that the court would have ruled in 
Italy’s favor.  As mentioned before, the margin of appreciation is a doctrine 
the court uses to allow the states of the European Union greater flexibility in 
charting the course of individual social issues.101   
                                                                                                                   
 92 Id. ¶ 16. 
 93 Id. ¶ 17.  
 94 Id. ¶¶ 70, 18–20. 
 95 Id. ¶ 162. 
 96 Id. ¶ 122. 
 97 Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), App. No. 13470/87 (1994). 
 98 Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993).  
 99 Grzelak v. Poland, App. No. 7710/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Folgreo and Others v. 
Norway, App. No. 1572/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007).  
 100 Witte & Arold, supra note 20, at 19.   
 101 See Shany, supra note 78; HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
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Generally, if the ECtHR determines that an action taken by a state 
violates the European Convention on Human Rights, the action is determined 
to fall outside of the state’s authority.102  When this occurs, the margin of 
appreciation cannot protect the state’s actions and the law or decision is 
likely to fall as a violation of the Convention.103  However, when an action 
the state has taken merely suggests a violation of the Convention, but may 
not rise to an actual breach, the doctrine may be used by the court to uphold 
the State’s action if it comports with the state’s ethics and norms.104  When 
this occurs, the state is generally allowed greater latitude in determining how 
to handle controversial issues.105   
The use of this doctrine is highly fact specific and greatly influenced by 
the culture of the appealing state, and its use can result in seemingly 
inconsistent decisions.106  For example, in the Sahin case the ECtHR 
determined that it was acceptable for Turkey to prohibit the wearing of 
religious garb in universities.  However, in Lautsi, the ECtHR allowed 
crucifixes to remain in the classrooms.107  Though these cases may appear 
inconsistent due to the nature of the challenges, within the confines of the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation they are not so untenable.   
The key difference between the two cases is an all or nothing concept.108  
For example, if Turkey proscribes all religious garb rather than targeting any 
group specifically, this is likely to be considered an equal, if burdensome, 
restriction.  The Turkish law may suggest violations of the Convention’s 
protection of religious participation as it does affect religious practice, but 
does not, at least as the ECtHR has interpreted the Convention, violate it.  
However, if some groups were allowed to wear their religious garb and other 
groups were targeted and prohibited from wearing religious clothing, the 
validity of the law would be far more suspect.  As applied to the case at 
issue, the crucifix law fell within the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, 
                                                                                                                   
DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 13 (1996) 
(discussing the application of the margin of appreciation).  
 102 See generally Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (discussing the 
general application of the test).  
 103 Shany, supra note 78, at 910. 
 104 Id.  
 105 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 119 
(2004–2005).  
 106 Shany, supra note 78, at 910. 
 107 Sahin, App. No. 44774/98. 
 108 This line of reasoning can also be found in cases like ABC v. Ireland where the Court 
determined that a state could proscribe abortion entirely, but, if the state allowed abortion in 
even extremely limited circumstances it, needed to ensure that abortion was available if the 
circumstances could be proven.  A, B, and C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2010).   
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because Italy allowed some crucifixes to be displayed but did not prohibit the 
display of other religious symbols.109 
B.  Salazar v. Buono 
Salazar v. Buono is a case that arose because of a cross placed at a 
national park as a war memorial to those who died in World War I by the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW).110  The cross, an eight foot tall structure 
made of metal tubes, was placed on top of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave 
National Preserve in San Bernardino County, California.111  The VFW placed 
the cross on Bureau of Land Management property in 1934, “along with a 
plaque memorializing the ‘Dead of All Wars’; though the plaque later 
disappeared.”112   
The cross remained in its place, undisturbed, for over sixty years.  Not 
only was it a war memorial, but Easter Sunday services were also celebrated 
at the site of the cross.113  However, the situation changed when, in 1999, the 
U.S. Park Service refused to allow a group to build a Buddhist stupa near the 
site of the cross on public property.114  The Park Service decided instead to 
remove the cross to avoid Establishment Clause concerns.115  Congress 
refused to appropriate the money that would have allowed the Park Service 
to remove the cross and “then designated it a national memorial to veterans 
of World War I; and, for good measure, prohibited the use of federal money 
to ‘dismantle’ a[ ] World War I memorial[ ].”116 
However, a Park Service administrator brought a claim alleging that when 
a cross was placed on public property and the same public property was “not 
open to groups or individuals [wishing] to erect other freestanding, 
permanent displays,” there was a violation of the Establishment Clause.117  
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the administrator and the case was not 
appealed to the Supreme Court.118   
However, instead of removing the cross, Congress initiated a land transfer 
moving the cross from public property to private property.119  This was 
                                                                                                                   
 109 Lautsi II, supra note 1.    
 110 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (U.S. 2010).  
 111 Ian Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 105 NW. U. L.  
REV. COLLOQUY 31, 31–32 (2010). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1812. 
 114 Bartrum, supra note 111, at 31–32. 
 115 Id. (discussing the history of the case’s early foundation).  
 116 Id. 
 117 Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (U.S. 2010) (No. 08-
472), 2009 WL 1526915; see also Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 118 Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 546, 550 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 119 Id. at 545. 
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facilitated by an order from Congress to the Secretary of the Interior 
demanding an exchange of the parcel of land on which the cross was placed 
for another similarly situated parcel of private property.120  Congress’s orders 
also required “the proviso that the property would revert to the government if 
the [land was not] . . . ‘maintained as a war memorial.’ ”121  By taking this 
action Congress hoped to make the case moot as the cross would no longer 
be on public property and would theoretically be outside the realm of 
Establishment Clause rules.122  However, this action itself implicated 
constitutional concerns since it was an action taken by Congress to protect a 
religious symbol.  It was this, the constitutionality of the land transfer, that 
was appealed and reached the U.S. Supreme Court.123  
The decision of the Supreme Court was fractured.  There were three 
concurrences and two dissents, in addition to the Court’s opinion.124  The fact 
that the actual case the Court decided did not deal directly with the 
constitutionality of the cross was the root cause of the Court’s splintered 
decisions.125  Thus it was, and is, difficult to draw a clear conclusion from 
the Court’s decision. 
Indeed, the Court did not offer a decision on whether or not the land 
transfer cured the Establishment Clause violations found by the Ninth 
Circuit.126  Instead, the Court determined that the issue of the land transfer 
should be remanded to the lower court to issue a ruling before any further 
determination was made.127    
This decision was, however, quickly rendered moot.  The cross, which 
had been covered by a box during the course of the Court’s decision-making 
process, was stolen.128  Although a temporary cross was erected in its place, 
that cross was removed by the Park Service.129  Currently, the case is still 
winding its way through the court system.  In this, the ultimate fate for the 
cross on Sunrise Rock remains as mysterious as its actual whereabouts. 
                                                                                                                   
 120 Id.  
 121 Bartrum, supra note 111, at 32; Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-87, § 8121, 117 Stat. 1054 (2003). 
 122 Bartrum, supra note 111, at 32–33. 
 123 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (U.S. 2010). 
 124 Id.  
 125 Dolan, supra note 28, at 43.  
 126 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1808.  
 127 Id. at 1809. 
 128 Dolan, supra note 28, at 43–44.  
 129 Id. at 44; Stanley Fish, When is a Cross a Cross?, N.Y. TIMES OPINION PAGES (May 3, 
2010, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/when-is-a-cross-a-cross/. 
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1. The Reasonable Observer 
A number of cases shed light on the Court’s Establishment Clause 
decision-making, although it would be difficult to clearly elucidate them all 
in this Note.130  However, the tests used to determine if a display of a 
religious symbol on public property violates the Establishment Clause are 
important to the discussion in this Note.  Thus, we will focus on the 
reasonable observer test.131   
Generally, the test, part of the hybrid Lemon/endorsement test requires 
that “a court . . . consider[ ] whether a reasonable observer, aware of the 
history and context of the community and forum in which the religious 
display appears, would understand it [the cross] to endorse religion or one 
religion over another.”132  While the history and context surrounding the 
display of a religious symbol are relevant, it is unclear exactly how much a 
“reasonable observer” is expected to know or indeed who the “reasonable 
observer” is expected to be.133  The Court and the ECtHR both appeared 
ready to evaluate their respective tests of religious symbols in public spaces.    
III.  ACCOMMODATION AS THE DECIDING PRINCIPLE 
A.  A Dual Movement to Accommodation? 
A consistent criticism of the first Lautsi decision was that the ECtHR 
appeared to assert a preference for symbols segregated from their religious 
background over those symbols whose religious theme could not be so 
removed.134  For example, Italy argued in the first Lautsi case that the 
crucifix no longer had a religious meaning of any merit.135  In Salazar, the 
                                                                                                                   
 130 See, e.g., LEONARD WILLIAMS LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT (1994) (discussing the relevant tests).  
 131 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (establishing the 
reasonable observer test).  
 132 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 452.  
 133 Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer’s Eyes: 
The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 452–52 (2006).  
The application of this test has been criticized in the court.  See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 901 (2005) (noting Justice Scalia’s argument that “the 
legitimacy of a government action with a wholly secular effect would turn on the 
misperception of an imaginary observer that the government officials behind the action had 
the intent to advance religion”) (emphasis in original); see also David Cole, Faith and 
Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 
584 (2002) (arguing that “the test provides few clear guidelines, and appears to turn on 
judges’ inevitably subjective assessments of a hypothetical reasonable observer’s perceptions 
about the cultural significance of state practices”).   
 134 Lautsi I, supra note 42, ¶ 35.  
 135 Id. 
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Supreme Court likewise appeared wary of a war memorial in the form of a 
cross, seeming more comfortable with war memorials that did not have a 
secondary religious meaning.136 
However, the recent decision by the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber in Lautsi v. 
Italy and the Supreme Court’s decision in Salazar v. Buono may suggest that 
the respective courts have become more favorable to a line of reasoning that 
incorporates and accepts both the religious meaning of a symbol and its 
secular purpose.  For example, the Lautsi decision utilized the concept of 
margin of appreciation in order to grant the state of Italy greater freedom in 
determining a use of religious symbols in the public square.  It can further be 
argued that in the most recent Salazar case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
indicated preference for a test that would allow religious symbols to remain 
on state property.  These tests would be more accommodating of the 
symbols’ purpose, both religious and secular.137  It is this, the parallel 
movement of the two courts, reflecting a more nuanced perspective of the 
place of these symbols in the public sphere, that is of most interest. 
Lautsi necessitated the need to balance the ideals of the majority, those 
who prefer the use of religious symbols in Italy, against the needs of the 
minority, those who prefer that crosses be absent from public spaces.138  This 
concern with balance reflected the ECtHR’s awareness that the complete 
removal of crucifixes from Italy would be a more difficult course of action 
than it would have been in a country with a lesser level of religious 
affiliation.139  
Furthermore, the Grand Chamber was likely cognizant of the danger of 
affiliating too closely with one side of the argument.  The Chamber did not 
wish to render a decision that would result in the removal of crucifixes 
because a group of individuals found their presence offensive.140  Nor does it 
appear from the text that the Grand Chamber wished to encourage the states 
to practice religious indoctrination in public schools.141  To make a decision 
without sacrificing either of these two competing interests, the court engaged 
in a factual determination balancing these two concerns of indoctrination and 
majoritarian preferences. 
                                                                                                                   
 136 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1808 (U.S. 2010). 
 137 Dolan, supra note 28, at 41–45.  
 138 Joseph Weiler’s Testimony before the European Court of Human Rights, dotSUB, July 
28, 2010, available at http://dotsub.com/view/65bc5332-aa10-4b8c-bc50-d051e8f4fcc7.  
 139 See, e.g., Isabelle Rorive, Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a 
European Answer, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2669, 2670 (2009); Peter G. Danchin, Islam in the 
Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 663, 701–03 
(2011) (discussing France’s relationship with religion). 
 140 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 66.  
 141 Id. ¶ 71. This is also the root issue behind a number of cases in schools regarding 
religious education.  
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First, the ECtHR dealt with the concern of indoctrination.142  The ECtHR 
explained that the simple presence of a religious symbol that “undoubtedly 
refers to Christianity . . . is not in itself sufficient . . . to denote a process of 
indoctrination on the respondent State’s part and establish a breach of the 
requirements of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.”143  In this statement, the court 
indicated that the presence of religious symbols alone do not violate the 
Convention simply because the symbols were placed publicly.144  
Furthermore, because Italy had mandated the crosses’ placement, the 
ECtHR’s decision also implicitly suggested that a government’s overt 
support of a religious symbol, even when the state’s constitution mandated a 
secular government, did not constitute indoctrination.145  Instead, the court 
required that there be some other factor to render symbol’s existence in the 
public square so egregious that the symbol could not remain where it was 
without violating the Convention’s protection of freedom of religion.146   
To support this, the ECtHR explained its decisions in the Folgero and 
Zengin cases.147  At issue in these cases were religious education classes in 
public schools.148  The ECtHR evaluated the totality of the circumstances and 
held that the teaching of religion was not so egregious that it fell outside the 
realm of the margin of appreciation.149  Members of minority religions 
brought both the cases, objecting to the presence of religious education that 
they alleged focused too heavily on the majority religion in Turkey and 
Norway, the nations in question.150 
Zengrin was highly relevant to Lautsi.  In Zengrin, the ECtHR determined 
that religious education classes could focus more heavily on the majority 
religion of the state (Turkey) simply because the religion which was being 
given preferential treatment was the “majority religion practiced in 
Turkey.”151  Thus, the Court relied on Folgero and Zengrin when it decided 
                                                                                                                   
 142 Id. ¶¶ 69–71. 
 143 Id. ¶ 71. 
 144 See, e.g., Danchin, supra note 139, at 721–23 (comparing Judge Bonello’s and Judge 
Power’s concurring opinions). 
 145 Art. 7 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.) (requiring that the Catholic Church and Italian 
government be independent). 
 146 An example of a situation that would rise to the level the court required would be 
requiring people to swear on the bible or otherwise invoke religious persons in order to serve 
as a member of a parliament or governing body.  Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, App. 
No. 24645/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999). 
 147 Folgero and Others v. Norway, App. No. 15472/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007); Hasan and 
Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, App. No. 1448/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. Former (2007).  
 148 See sources cited supra note 147.   
 149 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 71.  
 150 Folgero, App. No. 15472/02 (2007); Zengin, App. No. 1448/04 (2007).  
 151 Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 71 (discussing the Court’s previous decisions in Folgero and 
Zengrin).  
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that majoritarian preferences could be considered.152  Additionally, to 
address the concerns of indoctrination on the part of the state, the ECtHR 
relied on evidence that Italian schools freely encouraged the practice of other 
religions.153  
The ECtHR also addressed concerns of indoctrination by deciding that the 
crucifix was a “passive symbol.”154  The court noted that the crucifixes in 
schools were not addressed, gestured at, or remarked upon while studying or 
teaching students in class.155  Thus, the ECtHR felt that the crucifixes were 
unlikely to have the same effect on a student as, say, a teacher wearing a 
headscarf in a classroom.156  By including this analysis, the ECtHR 
distinguished the Lautsi case from the headscarf cases discussed earlier.157 
Finally, the ECtHR determined that Ms. Lautsi’s individual perception of 
the crucifix was not enough to prove a violation of the Convention.158  This 
final assertion allows the Lautsi decision to be reconciled with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Salazar v. Buono because it changed the focus 
of interpretation for cases of religious symbols.  Now, both courts look ready 
to examine their interpretations more narrowly. 
By allowing the crucifixes to remain, the Grand Chamber prevented Ms. 
Lautsi from asserting that her individual perception of a symbol could itself 
prove a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.  It also 
soothed concerns that every religious symbol could be deemed a violation of 
the convention because one person found it objectionable.159  However, in 
making this determination, the court accepted, and has been criticized for 
adopting, a majoritarian perspective towards questions of religion.160 
By taking this route, the ECtHR was able to accommodate the vastly 
different ideologies and perspectives towards religion existent in modern 
Europe.  In heavily emphasizing the concern of indoctrination, the court left 
open the possibility that, in other cases where there are more egregious 
circumstances, the court might make a different decision.  In those cases, it 
appears likely that the court will scrutinize the situation more carefully and 
may not apply the margin of appreciation.   
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Politically, the Grand Chamber’s decision was reasonable.161  It protected 
the ECtHR from the wrath of many organizations that viewed the decision of 
the lower chamber as a violation of religious freedoms.  By focusing on 
indoctrination, as well as classifying the crucifix as a passive symbol and a 
representation of the Italian State, the ECtHR was able to distinguish Lautsi 
from prior decisions.  Thus, the court could reasonably uphold both the 
Italian crucifixes and the Turkish ban on religious dress in universities.162   
The doctrine, by refusing to allow a single subjective interpretation of a 
symbol to determine its validity in the public square, is similar to the concept 
of a “reasonable observer.”163  This is because both methods require highly 
factual observations of the circumstances and do not bow to subjective 
interpretations of a symbol.164  Yet the ECtHR, by applying the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, goes slightly beyond the “reasonable observer” test.165  
The ECtHR, for better or for worse, may accommodate the majority religious 
perspectives of the various nations under its jurisdiction, while not 
completely abdicating its responsibility to protect minority religions from 
indoctrination.  In this manner, the ECtHR was able to deal with the question 
of religious symbols which hold alternate non-religious meanings.  
There is some evidence the U.S. Supreme Court, like the ECtHR in 
Lautsi, is moving towards a test that would allow a greater accommodation 
of religious symbols.166  After the 2010 decision in Salazar v. Buono, some 
have argued in favor of new theories of interpretation regarding religious 
symbols placed on public property.167  These newly argued theories focus 
less on the traditional two pronged endorsement tests used in past cases.168  
One of these alternative tests may arguably expand the reasonable observer 
test.  The other argues that religious symbols, which do not have a strongly 
indoctrinating or highly offensive character, should be acceptable within the 
public sphere normatively.  Both of these tests bear striking resemblances to 
some of the abovementioned theories relied upon in Lautsi v. Italy.  
The first theory can be interpreted as a reimagining of the reasonable 
observer test.  It requires what has been categorized as an “extraordinarily 
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reasonable observer.”169  This test would operate within the traditional sphere 
of the endorsement test, but would require an observer that has a unique 
understanding of the circumstances related to the religious symbol.170  For 
example, in Salazar the observer would be considered aware of the fact that 
the VFW placed the cross on the land and that Congress had deemed the 
cross a memorial for World War I veterans.171  Thus, it would not be enough 
that the observer only understood the religious connotation of the cross.172  
The hypothetical observer necessary to the test would also have to 
understand that the cross served the purpose of a memorial.173  Furthermore, 
the observer would have to be able to rationally consider and balance the 
religious symbolism of cross with its secular purpose, and then determine if 
the symbol constituted a government endorsement of religion.174   
The second theory that has been espoused is that of accommodation.175  
This theory holds that “[t]he Constitution does not oblige government to 
avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in society[,] . . . [r]ather, 
it leaves room to accommodate divergent values within a constitutionally 
permissible framework.”176   
It has been argued that this second theory is the predominate preference 
of the Court held by Justices Kennedy, Alito, Scalia, Thomas and Breyer.177  
Breyer’s rationale is that “cultural strife may be avoided when the Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not demand removal of every 
longstanding religious symbol from the public square.”178  According to Lisa 
                                                                                                                   
 169 Dolan, supra note 28, at 48; see also Roy, supra note 167, at 80–87; Douglas G. Smith, 
The Constitutionality of Religious Symbolism after McCreary and Van Orden, 12 TEX. REV. L. 
& POL. 93, 106 (2007) (outlining the reasonable observer test in various cases before 
criticizing it); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 638–39 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (noting that “fortunately, the reasonable person is not a hyper-sensitive plaintiff”). 
 170 Dolan, supra note 28, at 48; Adam Linkner, How Salazar v. Buono Synthesizes the 
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause Precedent into A Single Text, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
57, 66 (2011) (suggesting the observer must appreciate the moral dilemma Congress faced 
between honoring the memorial and respecting the Establishment Clause).  
 171 Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. 
REV. 713, 722 (2001) (explaining Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Capitol Square Review & 
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)).  
 172 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010) (“[A] Latin cross is not merely a 
reaffirmation of Christian beliefs . . . [but] a symbol often used to honor and respect those 
whose heroic acts, noble contributions, and patient striving help secure an honored place in 
history for this Nation and its people.”). 
 173 Dolan, supra note 28, at 49. 
 174 Id.  
 175 Roy, supra note 167, at 80. 
 176 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (U.S. 2010).  
 177 Roy, supra note 167, at 81–82. 
 178 Id.; see, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703–04 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(explaining that removing longstanding displays of the Ten Commandments throughout the 
U.S. would “create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013 11:20 AM 
530  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 41:507 
Shaw Roy, it seems unlikely that the Court still views religious symbols or 
monuments as outsiders.179  For example, she asserts that 
Alito stated that a monument ‘may be intended to be 
interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted by different 
observers in a variety of ways.’  Particularly in the context of 
symbols and displays, without a reasonable observer who can 
discern a message of exclusion the endorsement test loses 
much of its content.180 
In other words, because the endorsement test is dependent on a reasonable 
observer, which may not exist, it is not always the best test to use when 
evaluating religious symbols.  
The use of an accommodation approach has not been universally accepted 
and is complicated by the fact that Salazar does not explicitly rule on the 
constitutionality of the cross.181  However, if the Court does truly move in 
this direction and is dedicated to this path, it may offer a possibility, much 
like that sought in Lautsi, to preserve religious symbols in the public square 
without violating individual rights.  Some have criticized the accommodation 
approach as disingenuously “dereligionizing” sectarian symbols,182 but that 
perspective is too simplistic.183  Like the application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, the accommodation doctrine “does not demand a 
choice between two undesirable extremes—on the one hand, an obsessive 
focus on religion to the exclusion of important historical and cultural 
realities; and on the other, an implausible denial of a symbol’s religious 
character.”184 
In sum, both the ECtHR in Lautsi and the Supreme Court in Salazar, may 
be ready to espouse a doctrine of accommodation.  In applying this doctrine, 
the courts will make highly fact-specific decisions that evaluate the totality 
of the circumstances in which the religious symbols exist.  Yet, within that 
context, the courts will also leave open the possibility that further cases can 
be brought when there are examples of severe indoctrination or suppression 
of individual rights.  Finally, by applying this test, the courts reaffirm that it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to remove the religious connotation of a cross.  
Thus, the courts may accept that regardless of religious connotation, there are 
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some circumstances in which crosses will not violate religious freedom 
clauses simply because they are located on public ground.   
In the end, these two cases, though both factually and procedurally 
complex, represent a similarity of thought and ideology in two different 
courts halfway across the globe.  This similarity could signal a trend that, 
should it continue, points toward a global application of the accommodation 
doctrine.    
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Even with the extensive review and discussion that the decisions of Lautsi 
and Salazar have wrought in their respective jurisdictions, it is unclear how 
they will ultimately affect jurisprudence in either the European Union or the 
United States.  The ECtHR has been criticized for offering a politically 
expedient decision in the Grand Chamber’s ruling on Lautsi rather than a 
legally sound point.185  If this is the predominant interpretation that is 
eventually attached to Lautsi, then there is little need to evaluate the Court’s 
approach to symbols as an espousal of an accommodation principle.  
However, to assert that Lautsi was simply a political decision without 
evaluating its merits and its historical foundations would be unfair to the 
complexity of the issue.  On the other hand, the argument that the U.S. 
Supreme Court does not yet espouse a theory of accommodation is more than 
fair.186  Due to the procedural complications of the Salazar case itself, it is 
hard to declare anything definitive.  
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to a case, American Atheists 
v. Duncan in which the Tenth Circuit determined that crosses placed on the 
side of a highway as commemorative markers for dead policemen were 
unconstitutional.187  This case would have been an ideal test to determine 
whether the Court had truly moved towards a more accommodating test of 
religious symbols.  It is possible that, by refusing certiorari, the Court 
intended to disprove this notion and signal instead a reaffirmation of the 
more doctrinally rigorous reasonable observer/endorsement tests.188  Yet, it is 
hard to ignore the language that the Justices used as they debated the 
constitutionality of the land transfer of the cross in the desert.   
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The logic in the decision offered by the Grand Chamber in Lautsi v. Italy 
and by the various Justices in Salazar v. Buono is remarkably similar.  In 
both cases the courts were faced with a highly controversial decision about a 
religious symbol placed in a public space open to many observers.  That both 
courts appear ready to espouse a doctrine that would allow religious symbols 
to remain on public property may point towards the chosen path for each of 
these courts.  
Because of their role as final arbiter of disputes between governments and 
their people, the Supreme Court and the ECtHR will have to chart a course 
that protects individual rights without trampling on collective cultural and 
religious identities.  For now incorporating a principle of accommodation 
may be the best option, as it would afford protection for religious symbols 
while leaving open the possibility of rigorous review when indoctrination or 
oppression are concerns.  
For the European Union, the beginnings of the course of accommodation 
appear through the fact-sensitive evaluation which duly considers concerns 
about indoctrination and intimidation.  By choosing this course, the ECtHR 
allowed the countries of the European Union to display religious symbols so 
long as the same states did not restrict the rights of other people to practice 
their religion or lack of religion.  In addition, through the use of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine, the court allowed individual countries to chart their 
own paths. 
The course for the Supreme Court and the establishment jurisprudence 
remains less clear.189  The rules and tests used for purported violations of the 
Establishment Clause remain convoluted and unsure, applied differently by 
numerous courts.190  Regardless, it appears there is the possibility that the 
Court, like the ECtHR, will move towards a more accommodating test when 
questioning religious symbols.  This new test would recognize the religious 
nature of these symbols but would not sacrifice their other meanings to the 
religious connotation. 
Finally, if this is the course that the courts choose to take, there will be 
substantial consequences for future challenges to crosses placed on public 
property.  In the European Union, it appears that challengers will not only 
need to show that the cross is capable of substantial indoctrination but that 
the individual challenger’s interpretation of the cross will not be sufficient to 
sustain a challenge.  This showing will have to be accomplished within the 
context of a highly fact-specific case in which every relevant factor is taken 
into account when considering possible indoctrination.  This test will be 
fairly similar in the United States if the Supreme Court applies the 
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accommodation principle that this Note anticipates.  In the United States, if 
the Court chooses to utilize the hyper reasonable observer principle, a 
challenger will have to show that a person viewing the cross, who has every 
ounce of the relevant information, could not see the cross’s existence as 
anything other than an endorsement of religion.  Thus, both courts appear 
ready to use a similar principle to determine the cross’s validity.  The fact 
that these questions have arisen for both courts is not surprising.  What is 
interesting is that both courts appear willing to address the question in 
similar ways through a concept of accommodation.  
  
